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In this article I criticized the 2011 verdict of the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia), which found two Croatian generals guilty of war crimes and sentenced 
them to 24 and 18 years of imprisonment, respectively. Less than a year after the appearance 
of my article the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY overturned the verdict and acquitted the two 
generals. 
          Many people in Croatia feel that the recent verdict of The Hague Tribunal (ICTY) in the 
trial against the Croatian generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač is unjust and 
untenable. Are you, my unknown reader, of the same opinion? If yes, I’ll venture a bet that 
you haven’t carefully read the entire verdict of the Tribunal (1,377 pages). But no worries, I 
won’t criticize you for that. I’m actually on your side and I want to show that you’re right 
even more than you think. Namely, if you formed a negative opinion about the verdict on the 
basis of information from the media, a more detailed insight into its basic argument will just 
strenghten your first impression. 
Beyond a reasonable doubt? 
          Let’s look at one of the main charges brought by the Tribunal: ethnic cleansing, i.e. the 
alleged expulsion of many Serbs from Croatia in 1995. This specific charge entails the 
presence of the following three elements: (1) that the expulsion of the Serb population was 
planned by the Croatian authorities, (2) that this plan was carried out, and (3) that the Serbs 
left Croatia because of the implementation of that plan, and not for some other reason. 
          Before analyzing the Tribunal’s decision in more detail, it is important to explain why 
proving this kind of charge is an extremely difficult task. The basic reason is that the Tribunal 
set an extremely demanding standard of proof, which many countries do not have in their 
criminal law: proof beyond any reasonable doubt. This standard of proof means that a guilty 
verdict must not be delivered as long as there remains any reasonable doubt about the guilt 
of the accused. In other words, it is not enough to prove that it is more likely than not that the 
accused committed the crime. It is not enough even to prove that it is highly likely that the 
accused is guilty. Much more is needed. The evidence presented to the court must be so 
strong as not to leave room for any doubt in the mind of a reasonable person about the guilt 
of the accused. 
          Such a burden of proof already makes it very difficult to justify a decision about 
someone’s guilt. But things get even tougher when we recall that, as mentioned earlier, the 
charge of ethnic cleansing consists of three elements. Consequently, in order for the charge to 
be proved, it is obvious that each of these three elements must be proved separately. 
Furthermore, for the charge to be proved beyond any reasonable doubt, each of these three 
separate elements must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt. For if there happened to be 
even the slightest reasonable doubt about the presence of any of the three elements, then a 
reasonable doubt would also exist about whether the alleged crime of ethnic cleansing was 
committed (because the crime logically implies the presence of each of the three elements). 
All of this follows from a fundamental principle of the probability calculus, according to 
which the probability of a joint event (ABC) can never be higher than the probability of any of 
the component events (A, B, or C). 
          When we look at the prosecution's case from this point of view, the rules of the game 
are much clearer and it becomes more evident how this standard of proof complicates the 
justification of a guilty verdict. But the devil being in the details, let’s delve into them. 
1. Planning the “crime” 
          Both the indictment and the consequent verdict about the expulsion of the Serbian 
population revolve around the transcripts of the Brioni meeting held at the end of July 1995. 
Oddly, in the part of the verdict in which this document is analyzed in detail, it is difficult to 
find anything that could be seen as proof (let alone proof beyond any reasonable doubt) that 
the forcible displacement of Serbs from Croatia was really planned at the Brioni meeting. The 
best indication of how little evidence there is for such a serious charge is the fact that in its 
search for justification the Trial Chamber even had to engage in a semantic discussion of the 
possible interpretations of a single statement that President Tuđman made in the meeting. 
Moreover, the judges went out of their way to analyze the meaning of the Croatian 
word tobože (translated as “ostensibly”), trying to fathom what Tuđman had in mind when he 
said that the Croatian Army should “…give [the Serbs] a way out, while ostensibly 
guaranteeing their civil rights…” 
          It took the Court just two short steps to conclude that there was indeed a plan for ethnic 
cleansing. In the first step they concluded (a) that this particular statement by Tuđman was in 
fact “an expression of the true intent to show the Serbs a way out but at the same time to give 
them the impression that they could stay,” and based on this they further concluded (b) that 
the references at the meeting to civilians being given a way out “were not about the 
protection of civilians but about civilians being forced out.“ Both steps are very problematic. 
          First, with respect to claim (a), even though it may appear that the use of the 
word tobože could suggest doubts about the sincerity of the intention to guarantee Serbs their 
civil rights, isn’t it a bit extreme to rely on such meager evidence to draw this momentous 
conclusion that clears the path for long imprisonment sentences, and all this just on the basis 
of a single word casually spoken out in a discussion? 
          Secondly, the claim (a) that the Croatian authorities intended (with dubious sincerity) to 
make the departing Serbs believe that they could stay by no means justifies the claim (b) that 
there was a plan to force out those civilians from their homes. Moreover, it is completely 
unclear how people could be forced out merely by being shown a way out, and by being 
verbally reassured that they could stay. Everyone knows that the claim of expulsion 
necessarily implies the presence of force or the threat of force. And a proof of that absolutely 
necessary element (the planned use of force or the threat of force) was completely absent from 
the Chamber’s analysis of the alleged plan of the “joint criminal enterprise.” 
          But didn’t the Croatian political leadership expect that many Serb civilians would leave 
Croatia during and after Operation Storm? And didn’t the participants of the Brioni Meeting 
in fact wish for this kind of outcome? This is possible. However, that subjective moment is 
neither easy to prove nor was it, for that matter, an object of proof. Besides, even if it had been 
proved, this subjective moment in itself would neither be criminal nor could it constitute a 
crime of expulsion of civilians. By way of analogy, if I wanted to get rid of my noisy neighbor 
and even if I took certain (successful) steps in accomplishing that goal, no one could accuse 
me of expelling him from his home, unless I used force, a threat of force or some other illegal 
action. 
          It seems to me that, when thinking about the Tribunal’s verdict, many people commit 
the same fallacy. They ascribe an extremely negative attitude toward the Croatian Serbs to the 
then Croatian leadership and particularly to Tuđman (an attitude they themselves strongly 
condemn), and on this basis, they conclude that the military operation Storm must have also 
been to a certain degree contaminated with this “chauvinism from the top”. This reasoning 
makes some people think that the Hague verdict has certain validity after all. 
          But this is wrong. Whatever Tuđman’s position toward the local Serb population may 
have been, his actions are not on this ground automatically subject to legal condemnation, 
even if they were motivated by such morally questionable attitudes. How easy it is to fall into 
this kind of trap and make an inferential leap is best shown in the case of my old 
acquaintance Slavko Goldstein, a man who usually tries to give reasoned opinions and avoid 
taking extreme viewpoints. He recently expressed his agreement with the Tribunal’s verdict 
and also said that the Croatian generals Gotovina and Markač could have received a 
significantly lower sentence had their lawyers defended them as mere executors of the “joint 
criminal enterprise” and denied their role as “organizers.” This strategy would have basically 
come down to shouldering most of the guilt on Tuđman as the “mastermind” of the criminal 
enterprise. 
          But what exactly is Tuđman guilty of, according to Goldstein? The only thing 
he mentions is that Tuđman “passionately wanted to have as few Serbs as possible in 
Croatia” and that “when decisions were being made about Operation Storm, I can imagine, 
knowing him personally, that Tuđman was very pleased with the fact that many Serbs were 
already leaving.” Even if all of this were true, there would still not be a shred of any criminal 
liability there, and surely not for such a serious charge as ethnic cleansing. Goldstein’s 
speculations about what Tuđman “passionately wanted” or what he was “very pleased with” 
are completely irrelevant in the discussion on the Tribunal’s verdict, at least as long as that 
kind of analysis of Tuđman’s psyche is not credibly connected with some of his alleged 
criminal actions or plans. And Goldstein has provided no such connection. 
          The moral to be drawn from this and many similar examples is that we should not take 
our political or personal aversion toward someone (however morally justified that aversion 
might be) as a sufficient reason to support severe criminal sanctions against that person, and 
particularly not when these sanctions would have no legal justification. 
          For those Croatians who believe that the Croatian generals are innocent but that 
Tuđman deserved to be convicted in The Hague, I propose the following test. Imagine that in 
those crucial moments for Croatia in the 1990s it was not Tuđman who planned the liberation 
of the occupied territories, but some other Croatian politician whom you personally like 
better. Imagine further that the Tribunal’s verdict had completely the same content as now, 
but with the sole difference that Tuđman’s name was everywhere replaced by the name of 
your favorite politician (and similarly with Šušak and other potential “bad guys”). Of course, 
in this kind of scenario certain statements by your favorite politician would sound strange 
and even shocking. But times were hard, people often crack under challenging circumstances, 
or maybe it is precisely then that they show their true nature. Obviously, you have to be 
prepared for unpleasant surprises. Well, casting aside these peripheral issues, the point of this 
entire thought experiment is the following question: would you still believe in such an altered 
scenario (and only on the basis of the evidence presented before the Tribunal!) that the 
President of the Republic of Croatia should be considered guilty of crimes against humanity? 
I hope that this test of imagination will lead at least some of you to re-examine your opinion. 
          All in all, this analysis suggests that, with respect to the first of the three mentioned 
elements of the charge (i.e. the planning of the crime), the Tribunal’s verdict has offered 
nothing that would come remotely close to the level of proof “beyond any reasonable doubt.” 
2. From plan to implementation 
          The second element of the alleged crime is the implementation of the plan to forcibly 
displace Serb civilians. In support of that charge, the Tribunal claims that the excessive 
shelling of Knin and certain other areas caused fear and panic among the local civilian 
population, and subsequently led to their mass departure from Croatia. 
          Let’s leave aside the explanation of the mass departure of Serbs for a moment because 
this is the third element of the alleged crime. The focus here should be on the explanation of 
the excessive shelling. According to the assessment of the Tribunal itself, of all the projectiles 
that fell on Knin during the operation Storm, only fifty or so hit the locations that were not 
legitimate military targets (which amounts to around 5 percent of the total number of 
projectiles). 
          Why did this happen? One possible explanation would be that the Croatian military 
commanders estimated that firing fifty projectiles on non-military targets would be sufficient 
to achieve the “set goal“ of intimidating Serb civilians and that this was how they tried to 
implement the plan of ethnic cleansing entrusted to them. This scenario is certainly logically 
possible, but not much more than that. It was certainly not proved, and especially not beyond 
any reasonable doubt. 
          Some of the alternative, and initially no less plausible, scenarios include the following: 
(i) that these fifty projectiles may have simply missed their intended target due to a technical 
malfunction or human error, or (ii) that the Croatian military commanders (taking into 
account the official doctrine of the Krajina Serbs about the so-called “armed people” and their 
proclaimed obliteration of the distinction between soldiers and civilians) wanted to 
preemptively discourage any idea of armed resistance from ostensibly civilian areas, or (iii) 
that non-military locations were targeted intentionally, but only in order to crush resistance 
as quickly as possible, and not with the aim of causing an exodus, etc. With all these open 
possibilities the door to reasonable doubt remains wide open. 
          The court examined scenario (i) very superficially and dismissed it without adequate 
analysis, whereas scenarios (ii) and (iii) were not considered at all. Naturally, the truth of 
some of these alternative scenarios could still have brought with it a certain degree of guilt of 
the military commanders for some of their actions, but it would certainly exclude the 
possibility of accusing them of the intentional expulsion of civilians through excessive 
shelling. 
          Many commentators found some justification for the Tribunal’s verdict in the fact that 
after the operation Storm certain crimes that were committed against the Serb civilian 
population were left unpunished. However, that would justify the verdict only if the absence 
of punishment indicated that these crimes were planned or at least that it was somehow 
communicated to Croatian soldiers that these actions would be tolerated. There is no 
evidence of this, though. On the contrary, the Tribunal’s verdict itself mentions explicit 
instructions from the Ministry of Defense as well as the generals’ orders strictly forbidding 
burning, looting, harassment of civilians, etc. Even more important is the following general 
observation: if an officer under whose command a crime occurred does not afterward make 
sufficient efforts to punish the perpetrators, this fact alone does not mean that he wanted the 
crime to be committed or that he enabled it or in some way authorized it. He may be held 
liable for the fact that no one was punished, but he cannot, on this basis alone, be held to any 
degree responsible for the crime itself. 
3. Why did they leave? 
          We see that the Tribunal was unable to prove either the existence of a plan to expel the 
Serbs or the implementation of that plan. But, even if both those things had been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, this still wouldn’t have been enough to justify the verdict, 
because then it would have been necessary to prove the existence of the remaining, third 
element of the crime: that the departure of Serbs was really caused by the actions of the 
Croatian army, and not by some other factor. 
          But a potential alternative cause not only existed but had been screamingly present all 
those years during the Serb insurgency. I remember that just before the beginning of the war 
an acquaintance of mine, a Croatian Serb, went with a delegation to the then occupied areas 
to see if there was any way of finding a compromise through negotiations. Upon his return to 
Zagreb, he said that despite its repeated efforts the delegation wasn’t able to get any list of 
specific demands from the other side, as a precondition for their agreement to a peaceful 
reintegration into Croatia. He reported: “We asked them what they really want, but they 
didn’t make any demands. They simply don’t want to live in Croatia.“ 
          And this was the same clear message that the insurgent Serbs would continuously send 
later on, through their numerous other actions. Well, if this kind of unrelenting attitude and 
resolute refusal of any form of the Croatian state were characteristic of the mentality of the 
local Serb population, then it really seems that the following possibility should be seriously 
considered: that after Croatia eventually managed to establish its jurisdiction over its 
occupied territory many of those people who “simply didn’t want to live in Croatia“ 
concluded that the best solution for them would be to leave. This kind of reaction would be 
perfectly rational (from their point of view), given their at-the-time radically negative attitude 
toward Croatia and their ongoing and consistently manifested unwillingness to accept any 
kind of compromise. 
          Since this exceptionally strong and important psychological factor was not considered 
in the Tribunal’s verdict, and particularly because it was not refuted as a possible rival 
explanation for the exodus, it is impossible to agree with the Tribunal’s statement that the 
“primary and direct cause” of the Serb departure was the fear caused by artillery attacks. 
          What is particularly odd is that no attention at all was paid to this alternative 
explanation even after the Defense explicitly pointed out a very revealing fact that Serbs had 
also left the area of Eastern Slavonia en masse during its peaceful reintegration in the territory 
of the Republic of Croatia, and that they also left Kosovo as well as some parts of Bosnia after 
the international community took control over those territories. Note that in none of those 
situations was there excessive or non-excessive shelling. 
          Let’s compare the Serb exodus from Eastern Slavonia and from Knin. It is obvious that 
in the case of Eastern Slavonia the fear due to artillery attacks could not have been the 
“primary and direct cause” for the Serbs’ departure from Croatia. It must have been 
something else. But then isn’t it quite reasonable to conclude, given the many similarities 
between these two situations, that the cause of the exodus from Knin might have been the 
same? 
          This type of inference relies on one of the principles of basic common sense, which is 
nowadays regularly mentioned in textbooks on critical thinking and which was codified by 
John Stuart Mill in the mid-19th century as the so-called “method of agreement”. It says: “If 
two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one (antecedent) 
circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause 
of the given phenomenon.” The phenomenon under investigation, in this case, is the 
departure of Serbs from Croatia, and the two instances of the phenomenon are Eastern 
Slavonia and Knin. The only relevant circumstance in common in these two instances is the 
intense aversion toward life in the independent state of Croatia. Therefore… 
          I am not implying, of course, that this causal scenario is necessarily true. What I am 
trying to say is that it is highly plausible, that elementary logic suggests it as the first causal 
hypothesis to be examined, and that anyone who defends a different explanation while 
completely ignoring this scenario, cannot pretend to have proved anything convincingly (and 
certainly not beyond any reasonable doubt). 
          So although each of the three elements of the Tribunal’s argument needs to be proved if 
the responsibility of the Croatian authorities and the Croatian army for ethnic cleansing is to 
be established, we see that none of them withstands critical analysis and that the verdict 
hence loses its rational support on all three counts, particularly in the light of its exceptionally 
demanding standard of proof. 
Double standards 
          The authority of the Tribunal to issue a verdict cannot be disputed because Croatia has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, the verdict itself is difficult to accept, 
and not only because it is legally unfounded and profoundly unjust. There is something else 
here that jars the mind: double standards. While the key military commanders of the Croatian 
war of liberation are ending up in jail as criminals even though their guilt was never proved, 
leaders of another recent war of liberation are being celebrated as great statesmen and source 
of inspiration, even though they were undoubtedly involved in crimes of horrific proportions. 
          Let’s look at just one example, the massive expulsion of civilians during WWII and its 
aftermath. At the Tehran Conference in 1943 Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt discussed many 
thorny issues, one of them being how to deal with Stalin’s wish to keep a large portion of 
Poland after the end of the war, the very part that he annexed to the Soviet Union when he 
and Hitler, his then ally, attacked and dismembered that country in 1939. Churchill came to 
the rescue and suggested that Poland be “moved” westwards and thereby be compensated, at 
the expense of Germany, for the tremendous loss of its territories in the east. 
          In Churchill’s own words from his memoirs: “I then demonstrated with the help of 
three matches my idea of moving Poland westward. Stalin was pleased.” Of course, it must 
have been absolutely clear to everyone that implementing his matchstick trick would, in 
reality, involve the expulsion of millions of German civilians, an act which was a direct 
violation of the proclamation from the Atlantic Charter from 1941, according to which there 
were not going to be any territorial changes that would not accord with the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned. 
          Here is how Churchill openly advocated such a mass expulsion of Germans from areas 
in which they had been living for centuries: “Expulsion is a method which, insofar as we have 
been able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting. There will be no mixture of 
populations to cause endless trouble. A clean sweep will be made. I am not alarmed by these 
transferences, which are more possible in modern conditions.” (Churchill’s speech in the 
British Parliament in 1944) 
          And indeed, things went according to plan and soon the “clean sweep” was made. 
According to unbiased sources, somewhere between 12 and 14 million Germans were forced 
to leave forever their homes in a movement that a historian of that period called “the largest 
forced population transfer in human history.” At least half a million people lost their lives in 
the process. 
          No one was ever held accountable for those crimes and no politician (except Vaclav 
Havel) has ever expressed regret on behalf of his country for these crimes of mass ethnic 
cleansing in which a number of politicians were demonstrably involved. 
          On the other hand, we have The Hague Tribunal, which attributed to the Croatian 
political leadership and the Croatian army the responsibility for the same kind of crime even 
though this charge is in fact nothing but an unproved and arbitrary accusation. 
